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294 S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 293–306powerful force towards economic eﬃciency in the world.” Competition increases the probability that ﬁrms
with high costs will go bankrupt (Schmidt, 1997) and fear of bankruptcy is a strong incentive for managers
to exert the eﬀort required to remain competitive (Hart, 1983). Further analysis shows that product market
competition is a substitute for internal governance that reduces agency costs (Karuna, 2010; Giroud and
Mueller, 2011).
The role of related party transactions (RPTs) within business groups is widely discussed in the literature.
Eﬃciency-enhancing theory suggests that imperfect emerging markets increase transaction costs that can be
largely reduced through RPTs between the members of a business group (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000).
In contrast, agency theory argues that RPTs can be used in the expropriation of listed companies. In partic-
ular, business groups could use abnormal RPTs to tunnel resources from listed ﬁrms (Liu et al., 2008; Chang
and Hong, 2000).
Following these studies, particularly the methodology of Jian and Wong (2010), we classify RPTs as nor-
mal or abnormal. Normal RPTs can decrease the transaction costs of listed ﬁrms, whereas abnormal RPTs
can be used as a way of tunneling or propping business groups’ speciﬁc purposes. According to the eﬃ-
ciency-enhancing view, normal RPTs help ﬁrms to reduce transaction costs and increase value. This implies
that product market competition leads to a greater need for normal RPTs to reduce transaction costs. Given
that controlling shareholders with substantially more cash ﬂow rights have strong incentives to maximize ﬁrm
proﬁts through normal RPTs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), we expect to observe a substitution eﬀect between
product market competition and controlling shareholders’ cash ﬂow rights.
Our empirical evidence is consistent with these predictions. Using a sample of China’s A-share listed ﬁrms
from 2004 to 2009, we show that product market competition has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on normal RPTs.
That is, ﬁrms from more competitive industries tend to reduce transaction costs by increasing normal RPTs.
We also ﬁnd that product market competition and ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights have a
substitutive eﬀect on normal RPTs. Speciﬁcally, we note a positive relationship between ultimate controlling
shareholders’ cash ﬂow rights and normal RPTs. Moreover, this relationship is strongest in noncompetitive
industries and weakens as product market competition increases.
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, it adds to the rapidly expanding work
on the eﬀects of product market competition. For example, Aghion et al. (2006) investigate the relationship
between product market competition and vertical integration. Our results suggest that product market com-
petition also aﬀects ﬁrms’ transactions, i.e. ﬁrms from more competitive industries are more likely to have nor-
mal RPTs that reduce transaction costs. Second, our study has an important implication for research on
ultimate controlling shareholders. Previous studies have mainly investigated the tunneling of ultimate control-
ling shareholders based on agency theory, ignoring the alignment of interests between controlling shareholders
and other investors. Our results provide evidence that the cash ﬂow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders
have a positive eﬀect on ﬁrms. Finally, we shed light on the relationship between external and internal corpo-
rate governance. Previous studies have shown that product market competition can either complement or sub-
stitute for some internal corporate governance mechanisms (Karuna, 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2011). Our
ﬁndings support the substitution eﬀect by showing that the inﬂuence of ownership structure on the occurrence
of normal RPTs is weakened by product market competitiveness.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses and discusses the
related empirical predictions. Section 3 discusses methodological and empirical issues. Section 4 presents
our empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and hypothesis development
2.1. Product market competition and RPTs
Previous studies have shown that product market competition is pivotal in inﬂuencing ﬁrm proﬁtability and
corporate strategy. While earlier literature speculates that insuﬃcient competition leads to managerial slack,
Hart (1983) formalizes the idea that product market competition reduces managerial slack. In contrast, Raith
(2003) argues that competition induces ﬁrm exit, which creates higher cost reduction incentives for the
remaining ﬁrms. Following this, numerous studies have examined the economic consequences of competition
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liquidation probability and managerial incentives, but also reduces their proﬁt. Nickell (1996) ﬁnds that
increased product market competition is associated with higher productivity growth in a sample of UK man-
ufacturing ﬁrms.
Our study investigates the eﬀect of product market competition on RPTs, which are common in Chinese
listed companies due to the special institutional setting in China. A large number of Chinese listed ﬁrms have
been restructured from existing SOEs through “carve-outs” and they retain a huge amount of transactions
with members in their business groups. The role of RPTs and their determinants have been widely discussed
in previous studies. According to the “eﬃciency-enhancing view,” the absence of institutions makes it costly
for emerging market ﬁrms to acquire necessary inputs such as ﬁnance, technology and management talent. In
this context, a ﬁrm may be most proﬁtably pursued as part of a large, diversiﬁed business group that can act as
an intermediary between individual ﬁrms and imperfect markets (Khanna and Palepu, 1997, 2000). Zheng
et al. (2007) suggest that the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates internal markets and increases ﬁrm value.1 Ma and
Wang (2009) use the results of a case study conducted at Shanghai Fu-Shing Inc. to determine that RPTs
can be an eﬀective means of eﬃcient resource allocation.
However, RPTs can also be used as a means for controlling shareholders to satisfy particular needs. The
“tunneling” view argues that the operation of RPTs in business groups provides a convenient channel through
which controlling shareholders can transfer resources at the expense of minority shareholders in listed ﬁrms
(Chang and Hong, 2000; Cheung et al., 2006). Using a sample of China’s listed ﬁrms, Jian and Wong
(2010) reveal that abnormal RPTs are used by controlling shareholders to obtain private beneﬁts. In sum,
RPTs can be classiﬁed as normal or abnormal. Normal RPTs decrease the transaction costs of listed ﬁrms,
whereas abnormal RPTs act as a way of tunneling and propping up a business group’s speciﬁc needs. There-
fore, following Jian and Wong’s (2010) approach, we exclude abnormal RPTs and examine the relationship
between product market competition and normal RPTs.
Transaction cost theory suggests that product market competition increases uncertainty, thus increasing the
likelihood of vertical integration (Williamson, 1975, 1985). Aghion et al. (2006) argue that more competition
increases the likelihood of vertical integration in sharing innovation beneﬁts. Firms can beneﬁt from an
increase in normal RPTs in at least two ways. First, ﬁrms in competitive industries have higher bankruptcy
risk than those in noncompetitive industries. This implies that ﬁrms in competitive industries can increase nor-
mal RPTs to reduce transaction costs, which can partially mitigate their bankruptcy risk. Second, product
market competition may foster innovation and growth, allowing ﬁrms in competitive industries to share their
innovation surplus with other member ﬁrms in the business group through normal RPTs. Therefore, we antic-
ipate that product market competition is positively related to normal RPTs.
Hypothesis 1. Product market competition is positively related to normal RPTs.2.2. Product market competition, ultimate controlling structure and related party transactions
Controlling shareholders can play a role in eﬀectively monitoring the activities of ﬁrm managers, alleviating
the free-rider problem associated with dispersed shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Some researchers
have examined the relationship between the cash ﬂow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder and cor-
porate valuation (La Porta et al., 2002; Lins, 2003). Bertrand et al. (2002) investigate Indian business groups
and ﬁnd that their owners are often accused of expropriating from minority shareholders by tunneling
resources from ﬁrms in which they have low cash ﬂow rights to ﬁrms in which they have high cash ﬂow rights.
More recently, Lin et al. (2011) explore 3468 ﬁrm-year observations in 22 countries from 1996 to 2008 and ﬁnd
that the cost of debt ﬁnancing is signiﬁcantly lower for companies with large ultimate owner’s cash ﬂow rights.
Some researchers who have focused on China’s capital market have also found that ﬁrms in which the
controlling shareholder has higher cash ﬂow rights or lower separation between ownership and control
exhibit higher operating performance. For instance, Tong and Wang (2007) ﬁnd that controlling shareholders1 Zheng et al.’s (2007) conclusion is made when the ratio of internal product transactions to total assets is below 20% or above 50%.
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Recent studies have suggested that product market competition and internal corporate governance mech-
anisms are substitutes. For example, Karuna (2010) argues that product market competition can aﬀect the
strength of some internal governance mechanisms by inﬂuencing the costs and beneﬁts of monitoring, given
that competition acts as an important disciplinary mechanism in ﬁrm leadership. Giroud and Mueller (2011)
examine the interaction between product market competition and corporate governance and ﬁnd that weak
governance ﬁrms have lower equity returns, inferior operating performance and lower ﬁrm value, but only
in noncompetitive industries. More recently, Chhaochharia et al. (2012) use the Sarbanes Oxley Act as a nat-
ural experiment to explore the ways in which it shocked internal governance, examining the link between prod-
uct market competition and internal governance mechanisms. Consistent with the notion that product market
competition is a substitute for internal governance, they also ﬁnd that ﬁrms in noncompetitive industries expe-
rienced a larger improvement in operational eﬃciency after the approval of SOX than ﬁrms in competitive
industries.
Given the abovementioned literature, we focus on how product market competition and the ultimate con-
trolling structure inﬂuence normal RPTs. Product market competition acts as an important disciplinary mech-
anism, inﬂuencing the overall costs of monitoring. Firms in competitive industries have incentives to use
normal RPTs to reduce transaction costs. This implies that the inﬂuence of controlling shareholders is smaller
in ﬁrms in competitive industries. In contrast, the association between ultimate controlling shareholders’ cash
ﬂow rights and normal RPTs oﬀers a stronger incentive for ﬁrms in noncompetitive industries to lower trans-
action costs. Our second hypothesis is as follows:
Hypothesis 2. The inﬂuence of the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights on normal RPTs is
stronger in ﬁrms in noncompetitive industries than in ﬁrms in competitive industries.3. Research design
3.1. Sample and data
The China Securities Regulatory Commission promulgated the “Regulation on the Content and Format of
Information Disclosure of Firms with Public Equity Oﬀerings No. 2” on December 13, 2004. Chinese listed
companies have been required to disclose a block diagram of the title and control relationship between the
company and the actual controller since 2004. To adjust for the potential measurement bias of the ultimate
controlling structure, our sample period covers 2004–2009 in China’s A-share market. After eliminating ﬁnan-
cial companies, securities companies and companies with unavailable data, we obtain a sample of 5954 obser-
vations. The ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights variable is hand-collected and other ﬁnancial
variables are obtained from the China Securities Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
3.2. Variables
3.2.1. Product market competition variables
Following the literature, we measure product market competition using three variables: the number of mar-
ket participants in an industry (Num), the concentration ratio (CR4) and the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index
(HHI) (Curry and George, 1983; Haushalter et al., 2007; Karuna, 2007; Li, 2010). “Num” is deﬁned as the
total number of companies in an industry. The number of market participants in the industry has a direct
bearing on issues of concentration and competition. “CR4” measures the proportion of industry share for
the four largest ﬁrms. This measure is easy to interpret and indicates the market share (concentration) of
the four largest companies composing the industry, the maximum being 100% (monopoly). “HHI” is deﬁned
as the sum of the squares of the percentage shares of each company in relation to the total size of the industry.
A higher value of HHI indicates stronger product market competition.
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The manually collected ultimate controlling structure variables include the cash ﬂow rights proportion, vot-
ing rights held by the controlling shareholder and voting rights held by other top-10 shareholders. Following
La Porta et al. (1999), the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights are computed as the product of
that owner’s cash-ﬂow rights at each tier of the control chain (in some cases, more than one control chain
linked an ultimate owner to a ﬁrm at the bottom of a pyramid). In addition, we consider relationships between
the top 10 shareholders and their combined ownership positions. If the block diagram disclosed in the annual
report does not publish information on known shareholder relationships, then we amend the block diagram
and use it to calculate the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights variable (CashR).
Based on the above analysis, “CashR” is the product of the owner’s cash-ﬂow rights at each tier of the con-
trol chain. A higher CashR indicates better alignment of interests between ultimate controlling shareholders
and other investors.
3.2.3. Normal related party transaction variables
RPT data is taken from the CSMAR related party transaction research database. There are many types of
RPTs between listed ﬁrms and their business groups, including sales and purchases of goods and products,
accounts receivable and accounts payable, the exchange of assets, loans or loan guarantees. We include related
party sales and purchases as our measure of related party transactions, as sales and purchases are the most
frequent type of RPT (e.g. Liu and Liu, 2007; Hong and Xue, 2008). Furthermore, RPT is separated into three
categories: sales and purchases of goods and services (RPT), purchases of goods and services (RPT_Purc), and
sales of goods and services (RPT_Sale). “RPT” is measured as the sum of related purchases and sales divided
by total sales. “RPT_Purc” is measured as the sum of related purchases of goods and services divided by total
sales. “RPT_Sale” is measured as the sum of related sales of goods and services divided by total sales.
We adopt Jian and Wong’s (2010) approach to estimate normal RPTs. They use an OLS regression model
to obtain the abnormal component of RPTs that are associated with industry classiﬁcations and ﬁrm charac-
teristics such as leverage, size and growth. The residual term is the measure of abnormal related party trans-
actions and the predicted term is normal related party transactions. This model is widely used in recent related
party transaction research (e.g. Yeh et al., 2012). The following model is used:RPT ¼ b0 þ b1Levþ b2Sizeþ b3MTBþ Industry fixed effectsþ e ð1Þ
We run three sets of year-by-year (2004–2009) regressions, one each for RPT, RPT_Purc and RPT_Sale as
the dependent variables. The results are summarized in Appendix A. Furthermore, since our conclusions are
largely dependent on the validity of the model, we examine the correlation between RPTs and ﬁrm perfor-
mance. RPT is decomposed into normal and abnormal RPTs and the results show that normal RPTs are pos-
itively correlated with ﬁrm performance as measured by ROA, ROE or ROS. Abnormal RPTs are negatively
correlated with ﬁrm performance. These results are summarized in Appendix B.
Referring to Jian and Wong (2010), our control variables include Lev, measured as total debt over total
assets; Size, measured as the natural logarithm of total assets; and MTB, measured as the market value
divided by the book value of total equity at year-end.
3.3. Research model
To test Hypothesis 1, the following model is used:NRPT ¼ b0 þ b1PMC þ b2PROS þ e ð2Þ
PMC is represented by three variables: Num, HHI and CR4. The relationship between PMC and RPT may
be non-monotonic. Therefore, we rank ﬁrms according to their PMC and then sort them into PMC quintiles.
PMC_H is a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 when competition is in the highest quintile, and 0
otherwise. PMC_L is a dummy variable indicating when PMC lies in the lowest quintile of its empirical dis-
tribution. In response to Jian and Wong (2010), we add PROS as an important control variable that is mea-
sured as the return on sales of the ﬁrm 1 year before the related party transaction occurs.
Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Panel A: Product market competition
variables
PMC Product market competition represented by three variables: Num, CR4 and HHI
PMC_H One if PMC is in the highest quintile and zero otherwise
PMC_L One if PMC is in the lowest quintile and zero otherwise
Num Total number of companies in an industry, log of the number when regressed
CR4 1  RPi, Pi are the market shares of the four largest ﬁrms in an industry
HHI 1 RP 2i , Pi are the market shares of the ﬁrms
Panel B: Ultimate controlling shareholder’s
cash ﬂow rights variables
CashR The product of the proportion of voting rights at diﬀerent levels of the control chain
Panel C: Normal related party transaction
variables
RPT Sum of related purchases and sales divided by total sales
RPT_Purc Sum of related purchases of goods and services divided by total sales
RPT_Sale Sum of related sales of goods and services divided by total sales
NRPT Normal RPT following Jian and Wong (2010)
NRPT_Purc Normal RPT_Purc following Jian and Wong (2010)
NRPT_Sale Normal RPT_Sale following Jian and Wong (2010)
Panel D: Control variables
Lev Total debt over total assets
Size Natural logarithm of total assets
MTB Market value divided by book value of total equity at year-end
PROS Net income of last year divided by total sales of last year
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(CashR) and product market competition (measured by PMC, or PMC_H and PMC_L), the following model
is used. If product market competition and the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights are substi-
tutes, then the coeﬃcient of the interaction term will be negative.NRPT ¼ b0 þ b1CashRþ b2PMC þ b3CashR PMC þ b4PROS þ e ð3Þ
In the presence of clustered errors, OLS estimates are still unbiased but standard errors may be incorrect,
leading to incorrect inference in a surprisingly high proportion of ﬁnite samples (Petersen, 2009). Given this,
we use standard errors clustered at the ﬁrm level for all of our regressions. The main variables are presented in
Table 1.4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Descriptive statistics of product market competition variables
All of the variables in the regressions are winsorized at the top and bottom 1 percentile across years to con-
trol for the potential inﬂuence of outliers. The ﬁnal sample consists of 5954 ﬁrm-years, spanning the period
from 2004 to 2009. We present the descriptive statistics of product market competition variables in Table 2
and use three diﬀerent variables to measure the extent of product market competition. There is a signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in product market competition between industries. The variable Num shows that the most compet-
itive industries are Equipment and Instrument Manufacturing (C7); Petroleum, Chemical, Plastics and Rub-
ber Products Manufacturing (C4); and Metal and Non-metal (C6). The variable CR4 shows that the most
competitive industries are Equipment and Instrument Manufacturing (C7); Medicine and Biological Products
(C8); and Textile, Apparel, Fur and Leather (C1). The variable HHI shows that Equipment and Instrument
Manufacturing (C7), Medicine and Biological Products (C8) and Textile, Apparel, Fur and Leather (C1) are
Table 2
Sample description.
Industries 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Coverage
(%)
Num CR4 HHI
Farming, Forestry, Animal Husbandry and
Fishing (A)
20 23 25 22 24 23 137 2.30 38 0.49 0.90
Mining (B) 17 21 19 21 30 32 140 2.35 28 0.08 0.61
Food and Beverage (C0) 41 42 42 43 46 45 259 4.35 59 0.59 0.94
Textile, Apparel, Fur and Leather (C1) 43 47 47 54 52 48 291 4.89 66 0.74 0.97
Paper and Allied Products; Printing (C3) 17 20 22 26 27 26 138 2.32 31 0.48 0.90
Petroleum, Chemical, Plastics and Rubber
Products Manufacturing (C4)
111 118 111 122 132 125 719 12.08 162 0.72 0.96
Electronics (C5) 33 37 37 40 52 51 250 4.20 62 0.42 0.88
Metal and Non-metal (C6) 103 104 109 116 123 118 673 11.30 137 0.72 0.96
Machinery, Equipment and Instrument
Manufacturing (C7)
157 175 176 179 189 197 1073 18.02 233 0.78 0.98
Medicine and Biological Products (C8) 49 60 63 67 65 63 367 6.16 97 0.74 0.97
Other Manufacturing (C9) 11 14 13 16 16 17 87 1.46 23 0.39 0.88
Utilities (D) 33 45 43 46 50 47 264 4.43 63 0.54 0.92
Construction (E) 18 21 21 20 25 27 132 2.22 32 0.31 0.81
Transportation and Warehousing (F) 36 41 39 46 46 49 257 4.32 63 0.46 0.90
Information Technology (G) 53 60 57 58 68 63 359 6.03 94 0.40 0.83
Wholesale and Retail Trades (H) 43 44 41 46 46 51 271 4.55 92 0.61 0.94
Real Estate (J) 25 22 19 23 39 39 167 2.80 67 0.60 0.93
Public Facilities and Other Services (K) 18 19 18 23 28 28 134 2.25 45 0.60 0.92
Communication and Cultural Industries (L) 5 5 4 4 7 8 33 0.55 20 0.27 0.82
Conglomerates (M) 28 32 29 35 39 40 203 3.41 72 0.72 0.96
Subtotal 861 950 935 1007 1104 1097 5954
Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables N Mean Median SD Min P25 P75 Max
NRPT 5954 0.170 0.176 0.071 0.029 0.110 0.223 0.350
NPRT_Purc 5207 0.098 0.098 0.039 0.021 0.068 0.124 0.198
NRPT_Sale 5013 0.098 0.100 0.042 0.010 0.067 0.125 0.237
Num 5954 115.524 68.336 20.000 63.000 94.000 154.000 269.000
CR4 5954 0.623 0.694 0.167 0.060 0.509 0.753 0.817
HHI 5954 0.929 0.957 0.070 0.583 0.915 0.969 0.982
CashR 5954 0.353 0.338 0.177 0.031 0.212 0.491 0.750
PROS 5954 0.050 0.048 0.166 0.897 0.017 0.101 0.521
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ious proxy measures of product market competition.
4.2. Descriptive statistics of normal RPT variables
We use Jian and Wong’s (2010) model to estimate normal RPTs, normal related party purchases and nor-
mal related party sales. We use an OLS regression model to remove any abnormal RPT components that are
not associated with industry classiﬁcations and the identiﬁed ﬁrm characteristics. The range and number of
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for the 6 years of regressions are reported in Appendix A. The RPT models have an
adjusted R-square ranging from 0.041 to 0.079. The related party purchase models have an adjusted R-square
ranging from 0.029 to 0.069. The related party sales models have an adjusted R-square ranging from 0.026 to
0.080.
Table 3 shows the variables’ descriptive statistics. The mean (median) value of NRPT is 0.170 (0.176). After
distinguishing the direction of RPTs, the results suggest that the mean (median) value of NPRT_Purc is 0.098
Table 4
Correlation analysis.
NRPT Num CR4 HHI CashR PROS
Panel A: NRPT
NRPT 1
Num 0.447*** 1
CR4 0.270*** 0.746*** 1
HHI 0.170*** 0.608*** 0.918*** 1
CashR 0.131*** 0.046*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 1
PROS 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.113*** 1
NPRT_Purc Num CR4 HHI CashR PROS
Panel B: NPRT_Purc
NPRT_Purc 1
Num 0.327*** 1
CR4 0.239*** 0.758*** 1
HHI 0.099*** 0.544*** 0.804*** 1
CashR 0.185*** 0.057*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 1
PROS 0.117*** 0.082*** 0.092*** 0.064*** 0.111*** 1
NRPT_Sale Num CR4 HHI CashR PROS
Panel C: NRPT_Sale
NRPT_Sale 1
Num 0.343*** 1
CR4 0.127*** 0.749*** 1
HHI 0.019* 0.543*** 0.809*** 1
CashR 0.080*** 0.025* 0.060*** 0.077*** 1
PROS 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.064*** 0.112*** 1
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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number of companies in an industry and has a value ranging from 63 to 269.4.3. Correlation analysis
Person’s correlation coeﬃcients for the main variables in our analysis are reported in Table 4. Panel A
shows that the correlations between NRPT and PMC (measured by Num, CR4 and HHI) are positive and
signiﬁcant at the 1% level. As expected, we ﬁnd a positive correlation between NRPT and CashR, and NRPT
is also positively correlated with PROS. The correlation analysis is consistent when we change the dependent
variable NRPT into NPRT_Purc and NRPT_Sale.4.4. Regression analysis
Table 5 reports the regression results for product market competition and normal related party transac-
tions. As expected, the results in columns 1, 3 and 5 reveal that product market competition has a statistically
signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on normal RPTs. In column 2, we use two dummy variables instead of the variable
Num. The coeﬃcients (t-values) of Num_L and Num_H are 0.014 (3.86) and 0.057 (18.98). The results in
columns 4 and 6 are similar to the results in column 2. In summary, these results indicate that product market
competition is signiﬁcantly positively related to normal RPTs.
Table 6 reports regression results when we replace the dependent variable NRPT with NRPT_Purc and
NRPT_Sale. The empirical results are consistent with those in Table 5, which suggests that the extent of
related party purchases and related sales increases with the level of competition. For example, the coeﬃcients
(t-values) of Num, CR4 and HHI in columns (1) to (3) are 0.021 (17.55), 0.059 (9.25) and 0.042 (3.29), respec-
Table 5
Regression results for PMC and NRPT.
Dependent variable: NRPT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Num 0.050***
(25.37)
Num_L 0.014***
(3.86)
Num_H 0.057***
(18.98)
CR4 0.119***
(11.41)
CR4_L 0.042***
(12.29)
CR4_H 0.025***
(9.17)
HHI 0.180***
(6.51)
HHI_L 0.035***
(11.06)
HHI_H 0.025***
(7.66)
PROS 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.046*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 0.032***
(6.34) (4.89) (5.53) (5.97) (4.83) (4.28)
Intercept 0.062*** 0.161*** 0.094*** 0.173*** 0.000 0.152***
(6.36) (63.06) (13.87) (70.19) (0.01) (32.29)
N 5954 5954 5954 5954 5954 5954
Adj. R-sq. 0.203 0.119 0.081 0.098 0.036 0.091
N_clust 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362 1362
F 362.388 215.464 83.814 158.730 33.334 57.597
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
Table 6
Regression results for PMC and NRPT_Purc (NRPT_Sale).
Dependent variable: NRPT_Purc Dependent variable: NRPT_Sale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Num 0.021*** 0.023***
(17.55) (15.93)
CR4 0.059*** 0.032***
(9.25) (5.72)
HHI 0.042*** 0.010
(3.29) (1.23)
PROS 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.023***
(8.51) (8.22) (7.02) (4.80) (4.03) (3.63)
Intercept 0.001 0.059*** 0.057*** 0.007 0.077*** 0.088***
(0.17) (14.52) (4.87) (0.96) (20.12) (12.08)
N 5207 5207 5207 5013 5013 5013
Adj. R-sq. 0.127 0.078 0.027 0.11 0.021 0.006
N_clust 1260 1260 1260 1243 1243 1243
F 190.449 75.048 29.33 149.313 25.986 7.272
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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Table 7
Regression results for PMC, CashR and NRPT.
Dependent variable: NRPT
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A
CashR 0.131*** 0.121*** 0.311***
(2.62) (3.44) (7.19)
Num 0.057***
(14.02)
Num  CashR 0.017
(1.59)
CR4 0.160***
(7.65)
CR4  CashR 0.104*
(1.89)
HHI 0.335***
(8.52)
HHI  CashR 0.279***
(5.96)
PROS 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.031***
(5.57) (4.59) (3.96)
Intercept 0.111*** 0.048*** 0.162***
(5.65) (3.58) (4.43)
N 5954 5954 5954
Adj. R-sq. 0.231 0.103 0.064
N_clust 1362 1362 1362
F 200.332 58.061 31.714
Panel B
CashR 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.057***
(4.85) (4.98) (4.59)
Num_L 0.010
(1.42)
Num_H 0.075***
(12.70)
CashR  Num_L 0.015
(0.79)
CashR  Num_H 0.055***
(3.26)
CR4_L 0.033***
(4.78)
CR4_H 0.038***
(6.67)
CashR  CR4_L 0.027
(1.46)
CashR  CR4_H 0.037**
(2.29)
HHI_L 0.029***
(4.50)
HHI_H 0.033***
(4.86)
CashR  HHI_L 0.016
(0.94)
CashR  HHI_H 0.023
(1.24)
PROS 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.032***
(4.11) (5.27) (4.28)
Intercept 0.139*** 0.151*** 0.152***
(28.65) (32.00) (32.29)
N 5954 5954 5954
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Adj. R-sq. 0.138 0.115 0.091
N_clust 1362 1362 1362
F 120.492 89.916 57.597
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
Table 8
Regression results for PMC, CashR and NRPT_Purc (NRPT_Sale).
Dependent variable: NRPT_Purc Dependent variable: NRPT_Sale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CashR 0.067** 0.081*** 0.188*** 0.117*** 0.045** 0.110***
(2.24) (3.93) (3.14) (3.42) (2.50) (3.31)
Num 0.023*** 0.031***
(9.39) (11.06)
Num  CashR 0.006 0.022***
(0.87) (3.12)
CR4 0.084*** 0.050***
(6.81) (4.33)
CR4  CashR 0.063* 0.042
(1.92) (1.54)
HHI 0.114*** 0.056***
(3.44) (2.85)
HHI  CashR 0.161** 0.100***
(2.50) (2.73)
PROS 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.018***
(7.58) (7.01) (5.82) (4.37) (3.53) (3.12)
Intercept 0.024** 0.028*** 0.024 0.052*** 0.059*** 0.039**
(2.12) (3.65) (0.76) (3.76) (7.70) (2.16)
N 5207 5207 5207 5013 5013 5013
Adj. R-sq. 0.163 0.115 0.063 0.137 0.030 0.013
N_clust 1260 1260 1260 1243 1243 1243
F 116.729 63.219 26.592 85.194 16.642 7.745
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).
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tition is signiﬁcantly positively related to normal RPTs.
We then examine the interaction eﬀect of product market competition and the ultimate controlling share-
holder’s cash ﬂow rights on normal RPTs. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results of estimating Eq. (3). The
continuous variables Num, CR4 and HHI are used as the proxy variables for PMC in Panel A and the dummy
variables are used in Panel B. The coeﬃcients of CashR in columns (1) to (3) are 0.131, 0.121 and 0.311,
respectively. They are all statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Similar to the results in Table 5, the coeﬃ-
cients of Num, CR4 and HHI are signiﬁcantly positive. The results show that both product market competi-
tion and the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights have signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on normal
RPTs. The coeﬃcients (t-values) of the interaction terms Num  CashR, CR4  CashR and HHI  CashR
are 0.017 (1.59), 0.104 (1.89) and 0.279 (5.96), respectively. These results are consistent with
Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights have more inﬂuence
on normal RPTs in ﬁrms in noncompetitive industries than in ﬁrms in competitive industries. This implies that
product market competition is a substitute for internal corporate governance mechanisms. The results of
Panel B further suggest that this substitution only occurs at higher levels of competition.
In Table 8, we replace the dependent variable NRPT with NRPT_Purc and NRPT_Sale. Consistent with
the results in Table 7, the coeﬃcients of the interaction terms are generally signiﬁcantly negative.
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rights have an interaction eﬀect on normal RPTs, with the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights
in noncompetitive industries being more likely to increase normal RPTs. Our results are consistent with Kar-
una (2010) and Giroud and Mueller (2011) in that product market competition can act as a substitute for
internal corporate governance mechanisms.
5. Conclusion
Based on a sample of A-share Chinese listed ﬁrms from 2004 to 2009, we examine the eﬀect of product mar-
ket competition and the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights on normal RPTs. Product market
competition is not only pivotal in inﬂuencing corporate strategies, but can also be a substitute for internal gov-
ernance mechanisms.
We adopt Jian and Wong’s (2010) approach to estimate normal RPTs. Our empirical evidence shows that
product market competition has a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect on normal RPTs. This implies that ﬁrms in com-
petitive industries can increase normal RPTs to reduce transaction costs. Further investigation shows that
product market competition and the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights have an interaction
eﬀect on normal RPTs, with the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights in noncompetitive indus-
tries being more likely to improve normal RPTs. This provides evidence that product market competition can
act as a substitute for the ultimate controlling shareholder’s cash ﬂow rights on normal RPTs.
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Appendix A. Normal RPT regressions2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009Panel A: Normal RPTLev 0.231*** 0.146*** 0.129*** 0.116** 0.121*** 0.031
(4.24) (2.93) (2.71) (2.38) (2.85) (0.75)Size 0.053*** 0.026*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.011
(5.11) (2.73) (2.95) (3.08) (3.09) (1.57)MTB 0.032*** 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.007**
(2.81) (0.12) (0.59) (0.88) (1.22) (2.17)Intercept 0.908*** 0.344* 0.321* 0.340** 0.320** 0.152
(4.11) (1.68) (1.81) (2.03) (2.13) (0.99)Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 950 978 999 1078 1148 1154
Adj. R-sq. 0.079 0.068 0.057 0.041 0.064 0.055
F 6.400 5.762 5.051 4.043 5.603 4.508Panel B: Normal related party purchasesLev 0.147*** 0.070** 0.098*** 0.061* 0.045 0.007
(4.36) (2.11) (3.05) (1.91) (1.57) (0.27)Size 0.031*** 0.013** 0.020*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.009*(4.79) (2.10) (3.53) (3.13) (2.72) (1.85)
MTB 0.014** 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.003
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Intercept 0.504*** 0.145 0.272** 0.235** 0.202** 0.143(3.67) (1.08) (2.28) (2.12) (2.00) (1.40)
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 829 852 866 944 1010 1003
Adj. R-sq. 0.069 0.043 0.043 0.029 0.046 0.037
F 5.745 3.698 3.808 3.042 4.009 3.156Panel C: Normal related party salesLev 0.151*** 0.123*** 0.059* 0.095*** 0.086*** 0.041
(3.48) (3.31) (1.69) (2.67) (2.67) (1.29)Size 0.025*** 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.003
(3.14) (1.35) (0.21) (1.30) (0.10) (0.56)MTB 0.020* 0.007 0.003 0.005* 0.005 0.006**
(1.91) (0.87) (0.51) (1.75) (1.07) (2.20)Intercept 0.347** 0.069 0.138 0.037 0.079 0.117
(2.04) (0.46) (1.07) (0.31) (0.70) (1.02)Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 782 808 836 915 979 977
Adj. R-sq. 0.029 0.080 0.057 0.026 0.035 0.050
F 2.813 5.990 4.616 2.769 3.241 3.878
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).Appendix B. Correlation analysisNRPT ROA ROE ROSPanel A: Normal RPTs and ﬁrm performanceNRPT 1.000
ROA 0.142*** 1.000
ROE 0.068*** 0.367*** 1.000
ROS 0.030*** 0.408*** 0.154*** 1.000AbRPT ROA ROE ROSPanel B: Abnormal RPTs and ﬁrm performanceAbRPT 1.000
ROA 0.046*** 1.000
ROE 0.075*** 0.367*** 1.000
ROS 0.061*** 0.408*** 0.154*** 1.000
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed).
 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level (two-tailed).
*** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed).References
Aghion, P., Griﬃth, R., Howitt, P., 2006. Vertical integration and competition. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 96
(2), 97–102.
306 S. Chen et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 293–306Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S., 2002. Ferreting out tunneling: an application to Indian business groups. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117, 121–148.
Chang, S.J., Hong, J., 2000. Economic performance of group-aﬃliated companies in Korea: intragroup resources sharing and internal
business transaction. Academy of Management Journal 43 (3), 429–448.
Cheung, Y.L., Rau, P.R., Stouraitis, A., 2006. Tunneling, propping, and expropriation: evidence from connected party transactions in
Hong Kong. Journal of Financial Economics 82 (2), 287–322.
Chhaochharia, Y., Grinstein, Y., Grullon, G., Michaely, R., 2012. Product Market Competition and Internal Governance: Evidence from
the Sarbanes Oxley Act. Working Paper.
Curry, B., George, K.D., 1983. Industrial concentration: a survey. The Journal of Industrial Economics 31 (3), 203–256.
Giroud, X., Mueller, H., 2011. Corporate governance, product market competition, and equity prices. Journal of Finance 66 (2), 563–600.
Hart, Oliver D., 1983. The market mechanism as an incentive scheme. Bell Journal of Economics 14, 366–382.
Haushalter, D., Klasa, S., Maxwell, W.F., 2007. The inﬂuence of product market dynamics on a ﬁrm’s cash holdings and hedging
behavior. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 797–825.
Hong, J.Q., Xue, H., 2008. Eﬀect of counter-balance toward the largest shareholder on the amount of related party transactions and the
consistence of related party sales. Nankai Business Review 1, 24–30 (in Chinese).
Jian, M., Wong, T.J., 2010. Propping through related party transactions. Review of Accounting Studies 15 (1), 70–105.
Karuna, C., 2007. Industry product market competition and managerial incentives. Journal of Accounting and Economics 43, 275–298.
Karuna, C., 2010. Industry Product Market Competition and Internal Corporate Governance. Working Paper.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1997. Why focused strategy may be wrong in emerging markets. Harvard Business Review 75 (4), 41–51.
Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000. Is group aﬃliation proﬁtable in emerging markets? An analysis of diversiﬁed Indian business groups.
Journal of Finance 55 (2), 867–892.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54, 471–517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2002. Investor protection and corporate valuation. Journal of Finance 57,
1147–1170.
Li, X., 2010. The impacts of product market competition on the quantity and quality of voluntary disclosures. Review of Accounting
Studies 15 (3), 663–711.
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., Xuan, Y., 2011. Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics
100, 1–23.
Lins, K., 2003. Equity ownership and ﬁrm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38, 159–184.
Liu, J.M., Liu, X., 2007. The empirical research on the relationship between related party transactions and internal corporate governance
of listed companies. China Soft Science 1, 79–89 (in Chinese).
Liu, J.H., Wei, M.H., Zheng, G.J., 2008. The interested-party investment controlled by controlling shareholders: enhancing eﬃciency or
transferring resources. Management World 3, 133–141 (in Chinese).
Ma, J.C., Wang, L., 2009. The game of tunneling and propping from cluster controller: evidence from Fu-Shing business group.
Management World 12, 150–163 (in Chinese).
Nickell, S., 1996. Competition and corporate performance. Journal of Political Economy 104, 724–746.
Petersen, M.A., 2009. Estimating standard errors in ﬁnance panel data sets: comparing approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22, 435–
480.
Raith, Michael, 2003. Competition, risk, and managerial incentives. American Economic Review 93, 1425–1436.
Schmidt, Klaus M., 1997. Managerial incentives and product market competition. Review of Economic Studies 64, 191–213.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94, 461–488.
Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance 52 (2), 737–783.
Tong, Y., Wang, H.C., 2007. Related party transactions, beneﬁts of control and earnings quality. Accounting Research 4, 75–82 (in
Chinese).
Williamson, O., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. Free Press, New York.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York.
Yeh, Y.H., Shu, P.G., Su, Y.H., 2012. Related-party transactions and corporate governance: the evidence from the Taiwan stock market.
Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 20, 755–776.
Zheng, G.J., Wei, M.H., Kong, D.M., 2007. The larger shareholder’s internal market and value of a listed ﬁrm: an empirical test of the
eﬃciency and tunneling theories. China Accounting and Finance Review 9 (4), 1–41 (in Chinese).
